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ABSTRACT
With the widespread use of machine learning (ML) techniques, ML
as a service has become increasingly popular. In this setting, an ML
model resides on a server and users can query it with their data
via an API. However, if the user’s input is sensitive, sending it to
the server is undesirable and sometimes even legally not possible.
Equally, the service provider does not want to share the model by
sending it to the client for protecting its intellectual property and
pay-per-query business model.
In this paper, we propose MLCapsule, a guarded offline deploy-
ment of machine learning as a service. MLCapsule executes the
model locally on the user’s side and therefore the data never leaves
the client. Meanwhile, MLCapsule offers the service provider the
same level of control and security of its model as the commonly
used server-side execution. In addition, MLCapsule is applicable
to offline applications that require local execution. Beyond pro-
tecting against direct model access, we couple the secure offline
deployment with defenses against advanced attacks on machine
learning models such as model stealing, reverse engineering, and
membership inference.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning as a service (MLaaS) has become increasingly
popular during the past five years. Leading Internet companies,
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such as Google,1 Amazon,2 andMicrosoft3 have deployed their own
MLaaS. It offers a convenient way for a service provider to deploy
a machine learning (ML) model and equally an instant way for a
user/client to make use of the model in various applications. Such
setups range from image analysis over translation to applications
in the business domain.
While MLaaS is convenient for the user, it also comes with sev-
eral limitations. First, the user has to trust the service provider
with the input data. Typically, there are no means of ensuring
data privacy and recently proposed encryption mechanisms [8]
come at substantial computational overhead especially for state-
of-the-art deep learning models containing millions of parameters.
Moreover, MLaaS requires data transfer over the network which
constitutes to high volume communication and provides new attack
surface [29, 34]. This motivates us to come up with a client-side
solution such that perfect data privacy and offline computation can
be achieved.
As a consequence, this (seemingly) comes with a loss of control
of the service provider, as the ML model has to be transfered and ex-
ecuted on the client’s machine. This raises concerns about revealing
details of the model or granting unrestricted access to the user. The
former damages the intellectual property of the service provider,
while the latter breaks the commonly enforced pay-per-query busi-
ness model. Moreover, there is a broad range of attack vectors on
ML models that raise severe security and privacy risks [36]. A se-
ries of recent papers have shown different attacks on MLaaS that
can lead to reverse engineering [32, 46] and training data leakage
[16, 17, 39, 40, 49]. Many of these threats are facilitated by repeated
probing of the ML model that the service provider wants to protect
against. Therefore, we need a mechanism to enforce that the service
provider remains in control of the model access as well as provide
ways to deploy defense mechanisms to protect the model.
1https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/
2https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/
3https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/machine-learning-studio/
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1.1 Our Contributions
We propose MLCapsule, a guarded offline deployment of machine
learning as a service. MLCapsule follows the popular MLaaS para-
digm, but allows for client-side execution where model and compu-
tation remain secret. With MLCapsule, the service provider controls
its ML model which allows for intellectual property protection and
business model maintenance. Meanwhile, the user gains perfect
data privacy and offline execution, as the data never leaves the
client and the protocol is transparent
We assume that the client’s platform has access to an Isolated
Execution Environment (IEE). MLCapsule uses it to provide a secure
enclave to run an ML model classification. Moreover, since IEE
provides means to prove execution of code, the service provider is
assured that the secrets that it sends in encrypted form can only be
decrypted by the enclave. This keeps this data secure from other
processes running on the client’s platform.
To support security arguments about MLCapsule, we propose
the first formal model for reasoning about the security of local ML
model deployment. The leading idea of our model is a property
called ML model secrecy. This definition ensures that the client can
simulate MLCapsule using only a server-side API. In consequence,
this means that if the client is able to perform an attack against
MLCapsule, the same attack can be performed on the server-side
API.
We also contribute by a proof-of-concept of our solution. Due
to its simplicity and availability we implemented our prototype
on a platform with Intel SGX, despite the fact that the current
generation should not be used due to a devastating attack (see [11]).
Note that our solution can be used on any IEE platform for which
we can argue that it implements the abstract requirements defined
in section 6.
In more details, in our solution we design so called MLCapsule
layers, which encapsulate standard ML layers and are executed
inside the IEE. Those layers are able to decrypt (unseal) the secret
weight provisioned by the service provider and perform the compu-
tation in isolation. This modular approach makes it easy to combine
layers and form large networks. For instance, we implement and
evaluate the VGG-16 [42] and MobileNet [20] neural networks. In
addition, we provide an evaluation of convolution and dense lay-
ers and compare the execution time inside the IEE to a standard
implementation.
The isolated code execution on the client’s platform renders
MLCapsule ability to integrate advanced defense mechanism for
attacks against machine learning models. For demonstration, we
propose two defense mechanisms against reverse engineering [32]
and membership inference [39, 40], respectively, and utilize a recent
proposed defense [24] for model stealing attacks [46]. We show that
these mechanisms can be seamlessly incorporated into MLCapsule,
with a negligible computation overhead, which further demon-
strates the efficacy of our system.
1.2 Organization
Section 2 presents the requirements of MLCapsule. We provide
the necessary technical background in Section 3 and Section 4
summarizes the related work in the field. In Section 5, we present
MLCapsule in detail and formally prove its security in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 discusses the implementation and evaluation of MLCapsule.
We show how to incorporate advanced defense mechanisms in Sec-
tion 8. Section 9 provides a discussion, and the paper is concluded
in Section 10.
2 REQUIREMENTS AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we introduce security requirements we want to
achieve in MLCapsule.
2.1 Model Secrecy and Data Privacy
User Side. MLCapsule deploys MLaaS locally. This provides strong
privacy guarantees to a user, as her data never leaves her device.
Meanwhile, executing machine learning prediction locally avoids
the Internet communication between the user and the service
provider. Therefore, possible attacks due to network communi-
cation [29, 34] are automatically eliminated.
Server Side. Deploying a machine learning model on the client
side naively, i.e., providing the trained model to the user as a white
box, harms the service provider in the following two perspectives.
• Intellectual Property. Training an effective machine learning
model is challenging, the MLaaS provider needs to get suit-
able training data and spend a large amount of efforts for
training the model and tuning various hyperparameters [47].
All these certainly belong to the intellectual property of
the service provider and providing the trained model to the
client as a white box will result in the service provider com-
pletely losing these valuable information. In this paper we
consider the ML model architecture public and only consider
the model parameters as private information. However, our
approach can easily be extended to also protect the model
architecture by using tools that protect the privacy of the
code executed inside the IEE (e.g. using [6]).
• Pay-per-query. Almost all MLaaS providers implement the
pay-per-query business model. For instance, Google’s vision
API charges 1.5 USD per 1,000 queries.4 Deploying a machine
learning model at the client side naturally grants a user un-
limited number of queries, which breaks the pay-per-query
business model.
To mitigate all these potential damages to the service provider,
MLCapsule needs to provide the following guarantees:
• Protecting intellectual property
• Enable the pay-per-query business model
In a more general way, we aim for a client-side deployment being
indistinguishable from the current server-side deployment.
2.2 Protection against Advanced Attacks
Several recent works show that an adversary can perform multiple
attacks against MLaaS by solely querying its API (black-box access).
Attacks of such kind include model stealing [46, 47], reverse engi-
neering [32], and membership inference [39, 40]. These attacks are
however orthogonal to the damages discussed in Section 2.1, as they
only need black-box access to the ML model instead of white-box
4https://cloud.google.com/vision/pricing
access. More importantly, it has been shown that the current MLaaS
cannot prevent against these attacks neither [32, 40, 46, 47].
We consider mitigating these threats as the requirements of
MLCapsule as well. Therefore, we propose defense mechanisms
against these advanced attacks and show that these mechanisms
can be seamlessly integrated into MLCapsule.
3 BACKGROUND
In this section, we focus on the properties of Intel’s IEE implemen-
tation called Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and recall a formal
definition of Attested Execution proposed by Fisch et al. [15]. We
would like to stress that MLCapsule works with any IEE that imple-
ments this abstraction. We also formalize a public key encryption
scheme, which we will use for the concrete instantiation of our
system. We stress
3.1 SGX
SGX is a set of commands included in Intel’s x86 processor design
that allows to create isolated execution environments called en-
claves. According to Intel’s threat model, enclaves are designed to
trustworthily execute programs and handle secrets even if the host
system is malicious and the system’s memory is untrusted.
Properties. There are three main properties of Intel SGX.
• Isolation. Code and data inside the enclave’s protected mem-
ory cannot be read or modified by any external process.
Enclaves are stored in a hardware guarded memory called
Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which is currently limited to 128
MB with only 90 MB for the application. Untrusted applica-
tions can execute code inside the enclave using entry points
called Enclave Interface Functions ECALLs, i.e., untrusted
applications can use enclaves as external libraries that are
defined by these call functions.
• Sealing. Data stored in the host system is encrypted and
authenticated using a hardware-resident key. Every SGX-
enabled processor has a special key called Root Seal Key that
can be used to derive a so called Seal Key which is specific
to the identity of the enclave. This key can then be used to
encrypt/decrypt data which can later be stored in untrusted
memory. One important feature is that the same enclave
can always recover the Seal Key if instantiated on the same
platform, however it cannot be derived by other enclaves.
• Attestation. Attestation provides an unforgeable report at-
testing to code, static data and meta data of an enclave, as
well as the output of the performed computation. Attestation
can be local and remote. In the first case, one enclave can de-
rive a shared Report Key using the Root Seal Key and create
a report consisting of a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
over the input data. This report can be verified by a different
enclave inside the same platform, since it can also derive the
shared Report Key. In case of remote attestation, the actual
report for the third party is generated by a so called Quoting
Enclave that uses an anonymous group signature scheme
(Intel Enhanced Privacy ID [10]) to sign the data.
Side-channel Attacks. Due to its design, Intel SGX is prone to
side-channel attacks. This includes physical attacks (e.g., power
analysis), yet successful attacks have not yet been demonstrated. On
the other hand, several software attacks have been demonstrated in
numerous papers [9, 25, 48]. An attack specifically against secure
ML implementations was presented by Hua et al. [6]. Those kinds of
attacks usually target flawed implementations and a knowledgeable
programmer can write the code in a data-oblivious way, i.e., the
software does not have memory access patterns or control flow
branches that depend on secret data. In particular, those attacks
are not inherent to SGX-like systems [13]. Recently, Bulck et al.
[11] presented a devastating attack on SGX that compromises the
whole systemmaking the current generation of the SGX technology
useless. Even though the current SGX generation should not be
used in practice, future instantiations should provide a real-world
implementation of the abstract security requirements needed to
secure MLCapsule.
Rollback. The formal model described in the next subsection as-
sumes that the state of the hardware is hidden from the users
platform. SGX enclaves store encryptions of the enclave’s state in
the untrusted part of the platform. Those encryptions are protected
using a hardware-generated secret key, yet this data is provided to
the enclave by an untrusted application. Therefore, SGX does not
provide any guarantees about freshness of the state and is vulnera-
ble to rollback attacks. Fortunately, there exist hardware solutions
relying on counters [44] and distributed software-based strategies
[28] that can be used to prevent rollback attacks.
3.2 Definition for SGX-like Hardware
There are many papers that discuss hardware security models in a
formalized way. The general consensus is that those abstractions
are useful to formally argue about the security of the system.
Barbosa et al. [5] define a generalized ideal interface to represent
SGX-like systems that perform attested computation. A similar
model was proposed by Fisch et al. [15] but was designed specifically
to abstract Intel’s SGX and support local and remote attestation.
Pass, Shi, and Tramèr [37] proposed an abstraction of attested
execution in the universal composability (UC) model. In this paper
we will focus on the formal hardware model by Fisch et al. [15].
We decided to use this particular model because it was specifically
defined to abstract the features that are supported by SGX which is
the hardware used by our implementation. However, since we will
only use remote attestation in our instantiation, we omit the local
attestation part and refer the reader to the original paper for a full
definition.
Informally, this ideal functionality allows a registered party to
install a program inside an enclave, which can then be resumed
on any given input. An instance of this enclave possesses internal
memory that is hidden from the registering party. However, the
main property of attested execution is that the enclave creates an
attestation of execution. This attestation provides a proof for third
parties that the program was executed on a given input yielding a
particular output.
Formal Definition. We define a secure hardware as follows.
Definition 1. A secure hardware functionality HW for a class of
probabilistic polynomial time programs Q consists of the following
interface: HW.Setup, HW.Load, HW.Run, HW.RunQuoteskquote ,
HW.QuoteVerify. HW has also an internal state state that consists
of a variable HW .skquote and a table T consisting of enclave state
tuples indexed by enclave handles. The variable HW .skquote will
be used to store signing keys and table T will be used to manage
the state of the loaded enclave.
• HW.Setup(1n ): given input security parameter 1n , it gen-
erates the secret key skquote and stores it in HW .skquote. It
also generates and outputs public parameters params.
• HW.Load(params,Q): given input global parameters params
and program Q it first creates an enclave, loads Q , and then
generates a handle hdl that will be used to identify the en-
clave running Q . Finally, it sets T[hdl] = ∅ and outputs hdl.
• HW.Run(hdl, in): it runs Q at state T[hdl] on input in and
records the output out. It sets T[hdl] to be the updated state
of Q and outputs out.
• HW.RunQuoteskquote (hdl, in): executes a program in an en-
clave similar to HW.Run but additionally outputs an attesta-
tion that can be publicly verified. The algorithm first executes
Q on in to get out, and updates T[hdl] accordingly. Finally, it
outputs the tuple quote = (mdhdl, tagQ , in, out,σ ): mdhdl is
the metadata associated with the enclave, tagQ is a program
tag for Q and σ is a signature on (mdhdl, tagQ , in, out).
• HW.QuoteVerify(params, quote): given the input global pa-
rameters params and quote this algorithm outputs 1 it the
signature verification of σ succeeds. It outputs 0 otherwise.
Correctness. A HW scheme is correct if the following holds. For
all aux, all programs Q , all in in the input domain of Q and all
handles hdl we have:
• if there exist random coins r (sampled in run time and used
by Q) such that out = Q(in), then
• Pr[HW.QuoteVerify(params, quote) = 0] = negl(λ), where
quote = HW.RunQuoteskquote (hdl, in).
Remote attestation unforgeability is modeled by a game between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
(1) A provides an aux.
(2) C runs HW.Setup(1n , aux) in order to obtain public param-
eters params, secret key skquote and an initialization string
state. It gives params to A, and keeps skquote and state se-
cret in the secure hardware.
(3) C initialized a list query = {}.
(4) A can run HW.Load on any input (params,Q) of its choice
and get back hdl.
(5) A can also run HW.RunQuoteskquote on input (hdl, in) of its
choice and get quote = (mdhdl, tagQ , in, out,σ ), where the
challenger puts the tuple (mdhdl, tagQ , in, out) into query.
(6) A finally outputs quote∗ = (md∗hdl, tag∗Q , in∗, out∗,σ ∗).
A wins the above game ifHW.QuoteVerify(params, quote∗) = 1
and (md∗hdl, tag∗Q , in∗, out∗) < query. The hardware model is re-
mote attestation unforgeable if no adversary can win this game
with non-negligible probability.
ExpEnc,A (λ)
(sk, pk) = KeyGen(1n )
(m0, m1) ← A(pk); b ←$ {0, 1}
c ← Enc(pk, mb ); bˆ ← A(pk, c)
return bˆ = b
Figure 1: IND-CPA - security experiment.
3.3 Public Key Encryption
Definition 2. Given a plaintext spaceM we define a public key
encryption scheme as a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms:
• KeyGen(1n ) : on input security parameters, this algorithm
outputs the secret key sk and public key pk.
• Enc(pk,m) : on input public key pk and messagem ∈ M,
this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c .
• Dec(sk, c) : on input secret key sk and ciphertext c , this
algorithm outputs messagem.
Correctness. A public key encryption scheme is correct if for all
security parameters 1n , all messages m ∈ M and all keypairs
(sk, pk) = KeyGen(1n ) we have Dec(sk, Enc(pk,m)) =m.
Ciphertext Indistinguishability Against CPA (Chosen Plain-
text Attack). We say that the public key encryption scheme is
indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks if there exists
no adversary for which |Pr[ExpEnc,A = 1] − 12 | is non-negligible,
where experiment ExpEnc,A is defined in Figure 1.
4 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review related works in the literature. We start
by discussing cryptography and ML, concentrating on SGX and
homomorphic encryption. We then turn to mechanisms using wa-
termarking to passively protect ML models. In the end, we describe
several relevant attacks against ML models including model steal-
ing, reverse engineering, and membership inference.
SGX for ML. Ohrimenko et al. [33] investigated oblivious data
access patterns for a range of ML algorithms applied in SGX. Their
work focuses on neural networks, support vector machines and
decision trees. Additionally, Hynes et al. [23], and Hunt et al. [22]
used SGX for ML – however in the context of training convolutional
neural network models. Tramèr et al. [45] introduced Slalom, a
system which distributes parts of the computation from SGX to a
GPU in order to preserve integrity and privacy of the data. Gu et
al. [18] consider convolutional neural networks and SGX at test
time. They propose to split the network, where the first layers are
executed in an SGX enclave, and the latter part outside the enclave.
The core of their work is to split the network as to prevent the user’s
input to be reconstructed. Compared to [45] and [18], MLCapsule
is the first secure and privacy-preserving machine learning system
for offline deployment coupled with several defense mechanisms
addressing state-of-the-art blackbox-based attacks.
Cryptographic Solutions for ML Models. Homomorphic en-
cryption has been used to keep both input and result private from
an executing server [3, 8, 14, 26, 31]. In contrast to our approach,
however, homomorphic encryption lacks efficiency, especially for
deep learning models containing millions of parameters. Moreover,
it does not allows for implementing transparent mechanisms to de-
fend attacks on the ML model: the user cannot be sure which code
is executed. Furthermore, a server-side model protection might
require further computations on the encrypted user data and some-
times also a function of this data in plaintext (e.g. to decide whether
to accept a query). Lastly, cryptographic based solutions usually
do not achieve what we call perfect-privacy (even an unbounded
adversary cannot retrieve any information about the user’s data),
which is one of the main advantages of MLCapsule.
Watermarking ML Models. Recently, watermarking has been in-
troduced to claim ownership of a trained ML model. Adi et al. [1]
propose to watermark amodel by training it to yield a particular out-
put for a number of points, thereby enabling identification. Zhang
et al. [50], in contrast, add meaningful content to samples used as
watermarks. Watermarking as a passive defense mechanism is op-
posed to our work in two perspectives. First, MLCapsule deployed
on the client-side is indistinguishable from the server-side deploy-
ment. Second, MLCapsule allows us to deploy defense mechanisms
to actively mitigate advanced attacks against ML models.
Model Stealing and Reverse Engineering. Model stealing has
been introduced by Tramèr et al. [46]. The attacker’s goal here is
to duplicate a model that is accessible only via an API. Recently, a
defense to model stealing called Prada has been proposed by Juuti
et al. [24]. We will evaluate Prada’s feasibility in MLCapsule. Also
passive defenses to model stealing have been proposed under the
term of watermarking, for example by Adi et al. [1] and Zhang
et al. [50]. MLCapsule, however, allows to actively mitigate model
stealing attacks. A different line of work aims to infer specific details
of the model such as architecture, training method and type of non-
linearities, rather than its behavior. Such attacks are called reverse
engineering and were proposed by Oh et al. [32]. We propose a
defense against this attack and also show it can be integrated in
MLCapsule with little overhead.
Membership Inference. In the setting of membership inference,
the attacker aims to decide whether a data point is in the training set
of the target ML model. Shokri et al. are among the first to perform
effective membership inference against ML models [40]. Recently,
several other attacks have been proposed [19, 39, 49]. In this pa-
per, we propose a defense mechanism to mitigate the membership
privacy risks which can be easily implemented in MLCapsule.
5 MLCAPSULE
In existing MLaaS system, the service provider gives the user access
to an API, which she can then use for training and classification.
This is a classic client-server scenario, where the service is on the
server’s side and the user is transferring the data. We focus on
the scenario where the service provider equips the user with an
already trained model and classification is done on the client’s
machine. In this scenario, the trained model is part of the service.
This introduces the previously discussed problems, like for example
protecting the IP of the service provider or the user’s privacy. In
this section we introduce MLCapsule to tackle those issues and then
Provider
Untrusted IEE (secure)
Code
Code
Service app
1
2 3
2
1 - Initialize service app
2 - Request model from provider
3 - Store encrypted model in local machine
Figure 2: Our scheme with all steps of initialization.
argue how the requirements are met. We would like to stress that
the main advantage of MLCapsule is its simplicity.
5.1 Overview
We start with an overview of the participants and then introduce
MLCapsule with its different execution phases.
Participants. In MLCapsule, we distinguish two participants of
the system. On the one hand, we have the service provider (SP) that
possesses private training data that it uses to train an ML model.
On the other hand, we have users that want to use the pre-trained
model as previously discussed in Section 2.
We focus for the rest of the paper on deep networks, as they have
recently drawn attention due to their good performance. Addition-
ally, their size make both implementation and design a challenge.
Yet, MLCapsule generalizes to other linear models, as these can be
expressed as a single layer of a neural network.
We consider the design of the applied network to be publicly
known. The service provider’s objective is to protect the trained
weights and biases of all layers.
Approach.We now describe MLCapsule, which fulfills the require-
ments from Section 2. To start, we assume that all users have a
platform with an isolated execution environment. Note that this is
a viable assumption: Intel introduced SGX with the Skylake proces-
sor line. Additionally, the latest Kaby Lake generation of processors
supports SGX. It is further reasonable to assume that Intel will
provide support for SGX with every new processor generation and
over time every PC with an Intel processor will have SGX.
The core idea of MLCapsule is to leverage the properties of the
IEE to ensure that the user has to attest that the code is running
in isolation before it is provided the secrets by the SP. This step is
called the setup phase and is depicted in Figure 2. Once the setup
is done, the client can use the enclave for the classification task.
This step is called the inference phase and is depicted in Figure 3.
The isolation of the enclave ensures that the user is not able to
infer more information about the model than given API access to a
server-side model. Next, we describe MLCapsule in more details.
Untrusted IEE (secure)
Code
Code
Service app1
3
1 - Initialize service app
2 - Load encrypted model
3 - User sends image to app
4 - Return classification result to user
5 - Store model and counter
2, 5
3
‘Penguin’
4
Figure 3: Our scheme with all steps of offline classification.
Setup Phase. The user and the service provider interact to set up a
working enclave on the users platform. The user has to download
the enclave’s code and the code of a service application that will set
up the enclave on the user’s side. The enclave’s code is provided by
the SP, where the code of the service app can be provided by the
SP but it can also be implemented by the user or any third party
that she trusts. Note that the user can freely inspect the enclave’s
code and check what data is exchanged with the SP. This inspection
ensures that the user’s input to the ML model will be hidden from
the SP, as the classification is run locally and the input data never
leaves the user’s platform.
After the user’s platform attests that an enclave instance is run-
ning, the SP provides the enclave with secret data composed of
among others the weights of the network. Finally, the enclave seals
all secrets provided by the service provider and the service appli-
cation stores it for further use. Sealing hides this data for other
processes on the user’s platform. With the end of the setup phase,
no further communication with the SP is needed.
Inference Phase. To perform classification, the user executes the ser-
vice app and provides the test data as input. The service app restores
the enclave, which can now be used to perform classification. Since
the enclave requires the model parameters, the service app loads
the sealed data stored during the setup phase. Before classification,
the enclave can also perform an access control procedure that is
based on the user’s input data (available to the enclave in plaintext)
and the current state of the enclave. Due to some limitations (e.g.
limited memory of the IEE), the enclave can be implemented in a
way that classification is performed layer wise, i.e. the service app
provides sealed data for each layer of the network separately. In
the end, the enclave outputs the result to the service app and might
as well update its state, which is stored inside the sealed data. This
process is depicted in Figure 3.
5.2 Discussion on Requirements
Next, we discuss how MLCapsule fulfills the requirements stated
in Section 2.
User Input Privacy. MLCapsule is executed locally by the user.
Moreover, the user is allowed to inspect the code executed in the
secure hardware. This means that she can check for any communi-
cation command with the SP and stop execution of the program.
Moreover, off-line local execution ensures that the user’s input data
is private because there is no communication required with the SP.
We conclude that MLCapsule perfectly protects the user input.
Pay-per-query. To enforce the pay-per-query paradigm, the en-
clave will be set up during provision with a threshold. Moreover,
the enclave will store a counter that is increased with every classi-
fication performed. Before performing classification, it is checked
whether the counter exceeds this threshold. In case it does, the
enclave returns an error instead of the classification. Otherwise,
the enclave works normally.
This solution ensures that the user cannot exceed the threshold,
which means that she can only query the model for the number of
times she paid. Unfortunately, it does not allow for a fine-grained
pay-per-query, where the user can freely chose if she wants more
queries at a given time. On the other hand, this is also the model cur-
rently used by server-sideMLaaS, where a user pays for a fixed num-
ber of queries (e.g. 1000 in case of Google’s vision API). MLCapsule
can also be configured in a way that to perform offline inference the
user has to receive a signature of the service provider under some
function of the queried data, where this value is send in the clear
by the user. The function has be to collision-resistant, so that the
user cannot use the signature for two or more queries, and lossy,
so that this value loses most of the information of the preimage. A
practical candidate are cryptographic hash functions. This config-
uration allow for a more fine-grained access to model but at the
same time provides similar security guarantees to the offline mode.
Intellectual Property. MLCapsule protects the service provider’s
intellectual property by ensuring that the isolation provided by the
hardware simulates in a way the black-box access in the standard
server-side model of MLaaS. In other words, the user gains no addi-
tional advantage in stealing the intellectual property in comparison
to an access to the model through an server-side API.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we introduce a formal model for MLCapsule and
show a concrete instantiation using the abstracted hardware model
by Fisch et al. [15] and a standard public key encryption scheme,
which we recalled in Section 3. The goal is to prove that our con-
struction possesses a property that we call ML model secrecy. We
define it as a game that is played between the challenger and the
adversary. The challenger chooses a bit which indicates whether
the adversary is interacting with the real system or with a simulator.
This simulator gets as input the same information as the adversary.
In a nutshell, this means that the user can simulate MLCapsule
using a server-side API ML model. Hence, classification using an
IEE should not give the user more information about the model
than using an oracle access to the model (e.g. as it is the case for
a server-side API access). We would like to stress that this high-
level view on security is currently the best we can provide. Any
definition that tries to somehow quantify security of the model by
bounding the leakage of model queries has to be based on empirical
data. Thus, we circumvent this by stating that MLCapsule does not
leak more information about the model than a model accessed by a
server-side API.
We begin the description of the model by binding it with the
high level description presented in Section 5 using three algo-
rithms that constitute the interactive setup phase (Train, Obtain
and Provide) and the local inference phase (Classify). An overview
of how MLCapsule fits into this composition and details about the
instantiation are given in Figure 4. Moreover, in the next subsection
we describe the security model in more details and then present
our formal instantiation of MLCapsule.
6.1 Formalization of MLCapsule
We now define in more detail the inputs and outputs of the four
algorithms that constitute the model for MLCapsule. Afterwards,
we show what it means that MLCapsule is correct and show a game
based definition of ML model secrecy.
• Train(traindata): this probabilistic algorithm is executed by
the service provider in order to create a machine learning
model MLmodel = (MLdef ,MLsk) based on training data
traindata, where MLdef is the definition of the ML model
and MLsk are the secret weights and biases. To obtain the
classification outputdata for a given input data inputdata one
can execute outputdata = MLmodel(inputdata).
• Obtain(MLdef): this algorithm is executed by the user to
create a requestMLreq to use model with definitionMLdef .
Further, this algorithm is part of the setup phase and shown
in steps 1 and 2 in Figure 2.
• Provide(MLdef ,MLsk,MLreq): this probabilistic algorithm is
executed by the service provider to create a hiddenMLmodel
HMLmodel based on the request MLreq. Figure 2 depicts this
algorithm in step 3 of the setup phase.
• Classify(HMLmodel, inputdata): this algorithm is executed by
the user to receive the output outputdata of the classification.
Hence, it models the inference phase depicted in Figure 3.
Correctness.We say that MLCapsule is correct if for all training
data traindata, all ML models (MLdef ,MLsk) = Train(traindata), all
input data inputdata and all requests MLreq = Obtain(MLdef) we
have MLmodel(inputdata) = Classify(HMLmodel, inputdata), where
HMLmodel = Provide(MLdef ,MLsk,MLreq).
ML Model Secrecy. We define model secrecy as a game played
between a challenger C and an adversary A. Depending on the
bit chosen by the challenger, the adversary interacts with the real
system or a simulation. More formally, we say that MLCapsule is
ML model secure if there exists a simulator Sim = (Sim1, Sim2)
such that the probability that |Pr[Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−0(λ) = 1] −
Pr[Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−1(λ) = 1]| is negligible for any probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A.
6.2 Instantiation of MLCapsule
The idea behind our instantiation is as follows. The user retrieves a
program Q from the SP and executes it inside a secure hardware.
This secure hardware outputs a public key and an attestation that
the code was correctly executed. This data is then send to the SP,
which encrypts the secrets corresponding to the ML model and
sends it back to the user. This ciphertext is actually the hidden
Algorithm 1: Hardware Program Q
Input: command, data
Output: out
1: if command== "train" then
2: run the ML training on data receiving
MLmodel = (MLdef ,MLsk), storeMLmodel and set
out = MLmodel
3: else if command== "setup" then
4: execute (sk, pk) = KeyGen(1n ), store sk and set out = pk
5: else if command== "classify" then
6: parse data = (MLdef , c, inputdata) and execute
Dec(sk, c) = MLsk, setMLmodel = (MLdef ,MLsk) and
out = MLmodel(inputdata)
7: end if
8: return out
machine learning model, which is decrypted by the hardware and
the plaintext is used inside the hardware for classification. ML
model secrecy follows from the fact that the user cannot produce
forged attestations without running program Q in isolation. This
also means that the public key is generated by the hardware and
due to indistinguishability of chosen plaintext of the encryption
scheme, we can replace the ciphertext with an encryption of 0 and
answer hardware calls using the model directly and not theClassify
algorithm. Below we present this idea in more details.
• Train(traindata): executes MLmodel = (MLdef ,MLsk) =
Q(”train”, traindata). OutputMLdef .
• Obtain(MLdef): given MLdef , set up the hardware param-
eters params by running HW.Setup(1n ). Load program Q
using HW.Load(params,Q), further receive a handle to the
enclave hdl. Execute the HW setup command for program
Q by running HW.RunQuoteskquote (hdl, (”setup”, ∅)) and re-
ceive a quote (that includes the public key pk). Finally, set
MLreq = (params, quote).
• Provide(MLdef ,MLsk,MLreq): abort if the quote verification
failed: HW.QuoteVerify(params, quote) = 0. Parse quote =
(·, ·, ·, pk, ·), compute ciphertext c = Enc(pk,MLsk) and set
HMLmodel = (MLdef , c).
• Classify(HMLmodel, inputdata): parse the hidden model
HMLmodel as (MLdef , c) and return the output of
HW.Run(hdl, (”classi f y”, (MLdef , c, inputdata))).
6.3 Security
Theorem 1. The MLCapsule presented in Section 6.2 is model
secure if in the used public key encryption is indistinguishable
under chosen plaintext attacks and the hardware functionality HW
is remote attestation unforgeable.
Proof. We prove this theorem using the game based approach
starting with GAME0 that models the original ML model security
experiment with bit b = 1 and end the proof with GAME4, which
is the experiment for b = 0.
GAME1. Similar to GAME0, but we abort in case the adversary
outputs a valid requestMLreq without running programQ . It is easy
HW.Setup(1λ)
hdl = HW.Load(params, Q)
quote = HW.RunQuotesk      (hld, (‘‘setup’’,∅))
MLreq =(params, quote) Setup Phase
Inference 
Phase
Service Provider User
MLmodel=(MLdef,MLsk)=Q(‘‘train’’,traindata) Q, MLdef
MLreq 
HMLmodel 
  HW.run(hdl,(‘‘classify’’,(MLdef,c,inputdata)))
    quote
Obtain(MLdef)
Classify(HMLmodel ,inputdata)
Provide(MLdef,MLsk,MLreq )
Train(traindata) IEE
HW.QuoteVerify((params,quote))
quote = (  ,  ,  ,pk,  )
c = Enc(pk, MLsk)
HMLmodel = (MLdef,c)
Figure 4: Formal instantiation of MLCapsule.
Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−b(λ)
MLmodel = (MLdef, MLsk) ← Train(traindata)
MLreq ← A(MLdef )
if b = 0 HMLmodel ← Sim1(MLdef, MLreq)
else HMLmodel ← Provide(MLdef, MLsk, MLreq)
return bˆ ← AO(MLmodel,HMLmodel, ·)(HMLmodel)
O(MLmodel,HMLmodel, inputdata)
parseMLmodel = (MLdef, ·)
if b = 0 return Sim2(MLmodel, inputdata)
else return Classify(MLdef, HMLmodel, inputdata)
Figure 5: ML model secrecy experiment.
to see that by making this change, we only lower the adversary’s
advantage by a negligible factor. In particular, an adversary for
which we abortGAME1 can be used to break the remote attestation
unforgeability of the hardware model.
GAME2. We now replace the way oracle O works. On a given
query of the adversary, we always run Sim2(MLmodel, inputdata) =
MLmodel(inputdata). Note that this does not change the adversary’s
advantage, since both outputs should by correctness of MLCapsule
give the same output on the same input.
GAME3.We now replace the ciphertext given as part ofHMLmodel =
(MLdef , c) to the adversary, i.e. we replace c with an encryption
of 0. This change only lowers the adversary’s advantage by the
advantage of breaking the security of the used encryption scheme.
Note that by GAME1 we ensured that pk inside the requestMLreq
is chosen by the secure hardware and can be set by the reduction.
Moreover, oracle O works independently of HMLmodel.
GAME4. We change how HMLmodel is computed. Instead of run-
ning Provide(MLdef ,MLsk,MLreq), we use Sim2(MLdef ,MLreq) =
(MLdef , Enc(pk, 0)), where MLreq = (·, (·, ·, ·, pk, ·)). It is easy to
see that this game is actually the experiment Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−0(λ)
and we can conclude that our instantiation is ML model secure
because the difference between experiments Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−0(λ)
and Expsecrecy
MLCapsule,A−1(λ) is negligible. □
7 SGX IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In the setup phase, MLCapsule attests the execution of the enclave
and decrypts the data send by the service provider. Both tasks are
standard and supported by Intel’s crypto library [2]. Thus, in the
evaluation we focus on the inference phase and overhead the IEE
introduces to classification.
7.1 Implementation
We used an Intel SGX enabled desktop PC with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz that was running Ubuntu 18.04. The im-
plementation was done using C++ and based on the code of Slalom
[45], which uses a custom lightweight C++ library for feed-forward
networks based on Eigen. If not stated otherwise, we used the -O3
compiler optimization and C++11 standard. Yet, portingwell-known
ML frameworks (for example TensorFlow) to SGX is not feasible at
this point, because enclave code cannot access OS-provided features
(e.g. multi-threading, disk, and driver IO). However, any model used
in those frameworks can be easily translated into MLCapsule.
We wrap standard layers to create new MLCapsule layers. Those
layers take the standard input of the model layer but the weights are
given in sealed form. Inside the enclave, the secret data is unsealed
Table 1: Average dense layer overhead for 100 executions. This comparison includes two ways of compiling the code, i.e. with
and without the g++ optimization parameter -O3.
Matrix Dimension MLCapsule Layer (no -O3) MLCapsule Layer Standard Layer (no -O3) Standard Layer
256×256 0.401ms 0.234ms 0.164ms 0.020ms
512×512 1.521ms 0.865ms 0.637ms 0.062ms
1024×1024 6.596ms 4.035ms 2.522ms 0.244ms
2048×2048 37.107ms 26.940ms 10.155ms 1.090ms
4096×4096 128.390ms 96.823ms 40.773ms 4.648ms
Table 2: Average convolution layer (above) and depthwise
separable convolution layer (below) overhead for 100 execu-
tions and 3 × 3 filters.
Input/Output Size MLCapsule Layer Standard Layer Factor
64×224×224 80ms 66ms 1.21
512×28×28 61ms 51ms 1.20
512×14×14 30ms 13ms 2.31
64×224×224 41ms 27ms 1.52
512×28×28 7ms 7ms 1.00
512×14×14 2ms 2ms 1.00
Table 3: Average neural network evaluation overhead for
100 executions.
Network MLCapsule Layer Standard Layer Factor
VGG-16 1145ms 736ms 1.55
MobileNet 427ms 197ms 2.16
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Figure 6: Difference between MLCapsule and standard layer.
and forwarded to the standard layer function. MLCapsule layers are
designed to be executed inside the enclave by providing ECALL’s.
See Figure 6 for more details. This approach provides means to
build MLCapsule secure neural networks in a modular way.
Since the sealed data is provided from outside the enclave, it has
to be copied to the enclave before unsealing. Otherwise, unsealing
will fail. We measure the execution time of MLCapsule layers as
the time it takes to: (1) allocate all required local memory, (2) copy
the sealed data to the inside of the enclave, (3) unseal the data, (4)
perform the standard computation using the unsealed weights and
plaintext input and finally (5) free the allocated memory.
Implementation Issues. Applications are limited to 90 MB of
memory, because there is currently no SGX support for memory
swapping. Linux provides an OS based memory swap, but the en-
clave size has to be final and should not expand to prevent page
faults and degraded performance. This performance issue is visible
in our results for a dense layer with weight matrix of size 4096×4096.
In this case, the MLCapsule layer allocates 4× 4096× 4096 = 64MB
for the matrix and a temporary array of the same size for the sealed
data. Thus, we exceed the 90 MB limit, which leads to a decrease
in performance. In particular, the execution of such a layer took 1s
and after optimization, the execution time decreased to 0.097s.
We overcome this problem by encrypting the data in chunks
of 2 MB. This way the only large data array allocated inside the
MLCapsule layer is the memory of the weight matrix. Using 2 MB
chunks the MLCapsule layers requires only around 2 × 2 MB more
memory than implementations of standard ML layers. We imple-
mented this optimization only for data that requires more than 48
MB, e.g. in case of a VGG-16 network we used it for the first and
second dense layer.
7.2 Evaluation
Evaluation of Layers.Comparisons between MLCapsule and stan-
dard layers are given in Table 1 and Table 2. It is worth noting
that those results can be used to approximate the overhead of
MLCapsule for arbitrarily networks. However, below we evaluate
two full networks for image recognition. We do not compare di-
rectly to state-of-the-art cryptographic solutions because they use a
server side ML model architecture. On the other hand, we compare
the direct execution of the computation on the CPU and inside SGX,
as those results provide the overhead of implementing MLCapsule.
From Table 2, we see that the overhead for convolutional lay-
ers averages around 1.2, with a peak to 2.3 with inputs of size
512 × 14 × 14. In case of depth-wise separable convolutional layers,
the execution time of MLCapsule layers is comparable with the
execution time of standard layers. In this case, the difference is
almost not noticeable for smaller input sizes. Applying additional
activation functions or/and pooling after the convolution does not
significantly influence the execution time. In case of dense layers,
we observe a larger overhead. For all the kernel dimension the
overhead is not larger than 25 times. We also evaluate dense layers
without -O3 optimization. The results show that in such a case
the overhead of MLCapsule is around the factor 3. We suspect that
the compiler is able to more efficiently optimize the source code
that does not use SGX specific library calls. Hence, the increase in
performance is due to the optimized compilation.
Evaluation of Full Classification. In this subsection we combine
MLCapsule layers to form popular ML networks, i.e. VGG-16 and
MobileNet. The first network can be used to classify images and
work with the ImageNet dataset (size of images 224 × 224 × 3).
Similar, the second network can also be used for the same task.
It is easy to see from Table 3 that MLCapsule has around 2-times
overhead in comparison to an execution of the classification using
standard layer and without the protection of SGX.
8 ADVANCED DEFENSES
Recently, researchers have proposedmultiple attacks againstMLaaS:
reverse engineering [32], model stealing [46, 47], and membership
inference [39, 40]. As mentioned in Section 2, these attacks only
require a black-box access (API) to the target ML model, therefore,
their attack surface is orthogonal to the one caused by providing
the model’s white-box access to an adversary. As shown in the
literature, real-world MLaaS suffers from these attacks [39, 46].
In this section, we propose two new defense mechanisms against
reverse engineering and membership inference (test-time defense).
We show that these mechanisms together with a proposed defense
for model stealing can be seamlessly integrated into MLCapsule.
8.1 Detecting Reverse Engineering
Oh et al. have shown that by only having black box access to neural
network model, a wide variety of model specifics can be inferred
[32]. Such information includes training procedure, type of non-
linearities, and filter sizes, which thereby turns the model step
by step into a white-box model. This equally affects the safety of
intellectual property and increases attack surface.
Methodology.Up to now, no defense has been proposed to counter
this attack. We propose the first defense in this domain and show
that it can be implemented seamlessly into MLCapsule. We observe
that the most effective method proposed by Oh et al. [32] relies on
crafted input patterns that are distinct from benign input. Therefore,
we propose to train a classifier that detects such malicious inputs.
Once a malicious input is recognized, service can be immediately
denied which stops the model from leaking further information.
Note that also this detection is running on the client and therefore
the decision to deny service can be taken on the client and does
not require interaction with a server.
We focus on the kennen-io method by Oh et al. [32] as it leads to
the strongest attack. We also duplicate the test setup on the MNIST
dataset.5 In order to train a classifier to detect such malicious inputs,
we generate 4,500 crafted input image with the kennen-io method
and train a classifier against 4,500 benign MNIST images. We use
5http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
the following deep learning architecture:
Input Image→ conv2d(5 × 5, 10)
max(2 × 2)
conv2d(5 × 5, 20)
max(2 × 2)
FullyConnected(50)
FullyConnected(2)
softmax→ Output
where conv2d(a×a, b) denotes a 2d convolution with a by a filter
kernel and b filters, max(c × c) denotes max-pooling with a kernels
size of c by c , FullyConnected(d) denotes a fully connected layer
with d hidden units and softmax a softmax layer. The network uses
ReLU non-linearties and drop-out for regularization. We represent
the output as 2 units – one for malicious and one for benign. We use
a cross-entropy loss to train the network with the ADAM optimizer.
Evaluation.We compose a test set of additional 500 malicious in-
put samples and 500 benign MNIST samples that are disjoint from
the training set. The accuracy of this classifier is 100%, thereby
detecting each attack on the first malicious example, which in turn
can be stopped immediately by denying the service. Meanwhile,
no benign sample leads to a denied service. This is a very effective
protection mechanism that seamlessly integrates into our deploy-
ment model and only adds 0.832 ms (per image classification) to
the overall computation time. While we are able to show very
strong performance on this MNIST setup, it has to be noted that
the kennen-io method is not designed to be “stealthy” and future
improvements of the attack can be conceived that make detection
substantially more difficult.
8.2 Detecting Model Stealing
Model stealing attacks aim at obtaining a copy from an MLaaS
model [35, 46]. Usually, this is done by training a substitute on
samples rated by the victim model, resulting in a model with similar
behavior and/or accuracy. Hence, successful model stealing leads
to the direct violation of the service provider’s intellectual property.
Very recently, Juuti el al. [24] propose a defense, namely Prada, to
mitigate this attack which we implement in MLCapsule.
Pradamaintains a growing set of user-submitted queries.Whether
a query is appended to this growing set depends on the minimum
distance to previous queries and a user set threshold. Benign queries
lead to a constant growing set, whereas Juuti et al. show that mali-
cious samples generally do not increase set size. Hence, an attack
can be detected by the difference in the growth of those sets.
As the detection is independent of the classifier, it can be easily
implemented in MLCapsule. The resulting computation overhead
depends heavily on the user submitted queries [24]. We thus mea-
sure the general overhead of first loading the data in the enclave
and second of further computations.
Juuti et al. state that the data needed per client is 1-20MB.We plot
the overhead with respect to the data size in Figure 7. We observe
that the overhead for less than 45MB is below 0.1s. Afterwards,
there is a sharp increase, as the heap size of the enclave is 90MB:
storing more data requires several additional memory operations.
For each new query, we further compute its distance to all previous
Table 4: Overhead of detecting a model stealing attack, Prada. We assume 3000 samples in the detection set, enough to query
5000 benign samples.
Dataset Size SGX Outside SGX Factor
MNIST 1×28×28 35ms 2.6ms 13.5
CIFAR 3×32×32 38ms 10.1ms 3.8
GTSRB 3×215×215 2200ms 440ms 5
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Figure 7: Overhead in seconds to load additional data for
a defense mechanism preventing model stealing, namely
Prada [24].
queries in the set—a costly operation. We assume a set size of 3, 000,
corresponding to roughly 5, 000 benign queries. Table 4 shows that
a query on the GTSRB dataset6 is delayed by almost 2s, or a factor
of five. For datasets with smaller samples such as CIFAR 7 or MNIST,
the delay is around 35ms.
8.3 Membership Inference
Shokri et al. demonstrate that ML models are vulnerable to mem-
bership inference [40] due to overfitting: A trained model is more
confident facing a data point it was trained on than facing a new one
(reflected in the model’s posterior). They propose to use a binary
classifier to perform membership inference, and rely on shadow
models to derive the data for training the classifier. Even though the
attack is effective, it is complicated and expensive to mount. More
recently, Salem et al. relax the assumption of the threat model by
Shokri et al. and show that an adversary only needs the posterior’s
entropy to achieve a similar performance [39]. This attack causes
more severe privacy damages, thus we use it in our evaluation.
However, we emphasize that our defense is general and can be
applied to other membership inference attacks as well.
6http://benchmark.ini.rub.de/
7https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html.
Algorithm 2: Noising mechanism to mitigate membership
inference attack.
Input: Posterior of a data point P , Noise posterior T
Output: Noised posterior P ′
1: Calculate η(P) # the entropy of P
2: α = 1 − η(P )log |P | # the magnitude of the noise
3: P ′ = (1 − cα)P + cαT
4: return P ′
Methodology.We define the posterior of an ML model predicting
a certain data point as a vector P , and each class i’s posterior is
denoted by Pi . The entropy of the posterior is defined as:
η(P) = −
∑
Pi ∈P
Pi log Pi .
Lower entropy implies the ML model is more confident on the cor-
responding data point. Following Salem et al., the attacker predicts
a data point with entropy smaller than a certain threshold as a
member of the target model’s training set, and vice versa [39].
The principle of our defense is adding more (less) noise to a pos-
terior with low (high) entropy, and publishing the noised posterior.
The method is listed in Algorithm 2. In Step 1, we calculate η(P). In
Step 2, we derive from η(P) the magnitude of the noise, i.e.,
α = 1 − ηPlog |P | .
Here, ηPlog |P | is the normalized η(P) which lies in the range between
0 and 1. Hence, lower entropy implies higher α , i.e., larger noise,
which implements the intuition of our defense. However, according
to our experiments, directly using α generates too much noise to P .
Thus, we introduce a hyperparameter, c , to control the magnitude
α : c is in the range between 0 and 1, its value is set following cross
validation. In Step 3, we add noise T to P with cα as the weight.
There are multiple ways to initialize T , here, we define it as the
class distribution of the training data. Larger cα will cause the
final noised P ′ to be more similar to the prior, which reduces the
information provided by the ML model.
Our defense is a test-time defense, i.e., it does not modify the orig-
inal ML model. Meanwhile, previous defense mechanisms modify
the ML model which may affect the model’s performance [39, 40].
Moreover, previous mechanisms treat all data points equally, even
those that are unlikely to be in the training data. In contrary, our
defense mechanism adds different noise based on the entropy of
the posterior.
Evaluation. For demonstration, we perform experiments with
VGG-16 trained on the CIFAR-100 dataset. Our experimental setup
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Figure 8: The relation between the hyperparameter controlling the noise magnitude, i.e., c, and (a) membership prediction
performance and (b) target model utility. JSD(P , P ′) denotes the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the original posterior P
and the noised P ′, while |Pδ − P ′δ | is the absolute difference between the correct class’s posterior (Pδ ) and the noised one (P ′δ ).
follows previous works [39]. Mainly, we divide the dataset into two
equal parts, and use one part to train the VGG model, i.e., the train-
ing set, the other part is referred to as the testing set. Every data
point in the training set is essentially a member for membership
inference, while every data point in the testing set is a non-member.
Figure 8a shows the result. As we can see, setting c to 0, i.e.,
not adding any noise, results in a high AUC score (0.97) which
means the attack is very effective. The AUC score starts dropping
when increasing the value of c as expected. When the value of c
approaches 0.5, the AUC score drops to almost 0.5, this means the
best an attacker can do is random guessing the membership state
of a point.
We also study the utility of our defense, i.e., how added noise
affects the performance of the original MLmodel. FromAlgorithm 2,
we see that our defense mechanism only adjusts the confidence
values in a way that the predicted labels stay the same. This means
the target model’s accuracy does not change.
To perform an in-depth and fair utility analysis, we report the
amount of noise added to the posterior. Concretely, we measure
the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the original posterior (P )
and the noised one (P ′), denoted by JSD(P , P ′), following previous
works [4, 30]. Formally, JSD(P , P ′) is defined as:
JSD(P , P ′) =
∑
Pi ∈P
Pi log
Pi
Mi
+ P ′i log
P ′i
Mi
whereMi =
Pi+P ′i
2 . Moreover, we measure the absolute difference
between the correct class’s original posterior (Pδ ) and its noised
version (P ′δ ), i.e., |Pδ − P ′δ |, this is also referred to as the expected
estimation error in the literature [7, 41, 51]. In Figure 8b, we see
that both JSD(P , P ′) and |Pδ − P ′δ | increase monotonically with the
amount of noise being added (reflected by c). However, when c
is approaching 0.5, i.e., our defense mechanism can mitigate the
membership inference risk completely, JSD(P , P ′) and |Pδ −P ′δ | are
still both below 0.25: Our defense mechanism is able to preserve
the target model’s utility to a large extent.
Wemeasure the overhead of this defense and it only adds 0.026ms
to the whole computation. This indicates our defense can be very
well integrated into MLCapsule.
9 DISCUSSION
Our formal proof shows that our setting is indistinguishable from
the access to an MLaaS API. We want to emphasize that crypto-
graphic proofs do not guarantee security in the case of side channel
attacks, for example timing attacks. Also other attacks on classifiers
than the ones discussed here exist, for example evasion attacks. Such
evasion attacks were found to be hard to defend [12]. Current state-
of-the-art defenses are however applied before inference [21, 27, 38],
and can thus be integrated into MLCapsule without overhead. Ad-
ditionally, any defense or mitigation in MLCapsule is transparent,
as the code can be inspected, and thus MLCapsule does not rely on
security by obscurity.
Finally, in MLCapsule, the detection of an attack is promising:
in contrast to the standard MLaaS setting, an enclave is tied to a
particular person. It is hence possible to identify a user who submit-
ted malicious data. Additionally, setting up a fresh enclave requires
some effort. This implies that the service provider is actually able
to persecute or expel clients who are found out to run attacks.
10 CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel deployment mechanism for ML models.
It provides the same level of security of and control over the model
as conventional server-side MLaaS execution. At the same time, it
provides perfect privacy of the user data as it never leaves the client.
In addition, we show the extensibility of our approach and how
it facilities a range of features from pay-per-view monetization to
advanced model protection mechanisms – including the very latest
work on model stealing and reverse engineering.
We believe that this is an important step towards the overall
vision of data privacy in machine learning [36] as well as secure
ML and AI [43]. Beyond the presented work and direct implica-
tions on data privacy and model security – this line of research
implements another line of defense that in the future can help to
tackle several problems in security related issues of ML that the
community has been struggling to make sustainable progress. For
instance, a range of attacks from membership inference, reverse
engineering to adversarial perturbations rely on repeated queries
to a model. Our deployment mechanism provides a framework that
is compatible with wide spread use of ML models – but yet can
control or mediate access to the model directly (securing the model)
or indirectly (advanced protection against inference attacks).
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